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Abstract. We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of so-
cial dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to
enforce their strategy on the opponent. Coevolution thus here refers to an evolutionary process affecting
the teaching activity of players that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Particularly, we increase
the teaching activity of a player after it has successfully reproduced, yet we do so depending on the dis-
seminated strategy. We separately consider coevolution affecting either only the cooperators or only the
defectors, and show that both options promote cooperation irrespective of the applied game. Opposite to
intuitive reasoning, however, we reveal that the coevolutionary promotion of players spreading defection
is, in the long run, more beneficial for cooperation than the likewise promotion of cooperators. We explain
the contradictory impact of the two considered coevolutionary rules by examining the differences between
resulting heterogeneities that segregate participating players, and furthermore, demonstrate that the in-
fluential individuals completely determine the final outcome of the games. Our findings are immune to
changes defining the type of considered social dilemmas and highlight that the heterogeneity of players,
resulting in a positive feedback mechanism, is a fundamental property promoting cooperation in groups of
selfish individuals.
PACS. 02.50.Le Decision theory and game theory – 87.23.Ge Dynamics of social systems – 89.75.Fb
Structures and organization in complex systems
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1 Introduction
Social dilemmas constitute situations in which private or
personal interests are at odds with the collective wellbe-
ing [1,2]. Indeed, such situations are commonplace in the
real world.While selfish individuals mostly champion their
own prosperity and success, communities hosting them
eventually require attention in form of altruistic acts as
well. Failing to acknowledge this seemingly very reason-
able demand begets havoc and leads to distress. Such ten-
sions building up due to discrepancies between personal
comfort and social welfare are at the core of all social
dilemmas. Mutually cooperative behavior [3] is considered
an universal escape hatch out of the crux, whereby pros-
perity of individuals is partially sacrificed and put sec-
ond place on behalf of common interests. Evolutionary
game theory [4,5,6,7] provides competent mathematical
tools to address and study different social dilemmas, and
has since its establishment advanced to the preferred way
of approaching the problem across many areas of social
and natural sciences. Although the prisoner’s dilemma still
seems to be ahead of other games in terms of research ef-
forts devoted to them, alternatives are catching up as the
actual payoff ranking was dubbed difficult [8,9] and the
established results related to the promotion of coopera-
tion by spatial structure [10,11,12] have been questioned
within the related snowdrift game [13]. Indeed, several re-
cent works have focused on different social dilemmas in
order to extend the scope of presented findings and re-
iterate their importance [14,15,16,17,18,19]. Given that
seemingly minute difference between payoff rankings can
have a rather profound effect on the success of participat-
ing strategies, this trend is desirable and should be contin-
ued while aspiring for cooperation within the evolutionary
game theory.
Research published in recent years has made it clear
that heterogeneities amongst players might play a crucial
role in the evolution of cooperation. For example, scale-
free networks have been recognized as potent promoters
of cooperative behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma, snow-
drift and the stag-hunt game [14,15]. In fact, evolution-
ary games on complex networks [20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,
28,29,30,31] in general tend to promote cooperation past
the boundaries imposed by regular lattices, as comprehen-
sively reviewed in [32]. Similarly, heterogeneities in strat-
egy adoption probabilities can also enhance cooperation
[33,34,35,36], especially if the strategy adoption is favored
from the more influential players [37]. Heterogeneities can
also be introduced directly to payoffs in terms of dynam-
ical [38,39,40] or quenched [41] noise, whereby coopera-
tors are promoted as well provided the uncertainties are
adequately adjusted and distributed. While virtually all
above approaches can be interpreted as justified within
one or another real life scenario, the question remaining
is how can we avoid introducing the heterogeneities man-
ually and allow them to emerge spontaneously as an ac-
companying part of the evolutionary process affecting the
distribution of strategies. Similar questions have been ad-
dressed by Pacheco et. al. introducing dynamical linking
in games on graphs [16,42], as well as by Poncela et. al.
elaborating on the emergence of complex networks via evo-
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lutionary preferential attachment [43], and by Pestelacci
et. al. who studied the evolution of cooperation and co-
ordination [44]. Notably, somewhat earlier studies already
employed random or intentional rewiring procedures [45,
46,47] to elaborate on the sustainability of cooperation
within social dilemmas. Besides trying to generate the de-
sired heterogeneities via evolving interaction networks, an
alternative coevolutionary approach affecting the diversity
of players teaching activities has recently been proposed
[17]. The teaching activity of each individual quantifies its
ability to enforce its strategy on the opponent, whereby in
accordance with logical reasoning, active individuals are
more likely to reproduce than players characterized with
a low teaching activity. Resulting heterogeneities from the
coevolutionary process were found to promote cooperation
in the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. Despite
of the obvious differences between the coevolution of net-
works and teaching activity, however, we argue that both
have a similar impact on the evolution of cooperation in
that an increase of the teaching activity and an increase
of degree both indirectly make the player more influential
within the population. Hence, results presented by Pon-
cela et al. [43], for example, are related to our work [17] in
that they both incorporate a rich-gets-riches scheme de-
spite of the fact that the former approach involves growth
as well.
Nevertheless, it is not straightforward to assume that
all donors should be promoted by increasing their teaching
activities after a successful strategy transfer. In particular,
one may argue that the act of promotion should depend
on the type of the transferred strategy. This distinction is
motivated by the essential conflict between personal wel-
fare and common good underpinning all social dilemmas,
and as we will show below, may indeed vitally affect the
evolutionary success of participating strategies. To clarify
this issue, we here study two different coevolutionary rules
separately. In both cases the game starts by assigning the
same low teaching activity to all players, and subsequently,
parallel with the evolution of strategies the teaching ac-
tivity is evolved as well. The difference is that in one case
this coevolutionary rule applies only to cooperators and in
the other it applies only to defectors. While both coevo-
lutionary rules do promote cooperative behavior, the co-
evolutionary promotion of players spreading defection is,
in the long run, more beneficial for cooperation than the
likewise direct promotion of cooperators. Although being
rather surprising, we shed light on this result by exam-
ining the differences between resulting heterogeneities in
teaching activity that segregate the players into groups
of active and virtually inactive individuals. Moreover, we
reveal that the active individuals fully dominate the strat-
egy transfers and thus completely determine the final out-
come of the games in terms of average strategy densities
on the grid. Given the simplicity of the considered coevo-
lutionary rules, this work outlines a new and transpar-
ent route towards cooperation in structured populations
of self-interested individuals, and it reiterates the impor-
tance and potency of influential players in maintaining a
high level of overall welfare irrespective of the type of the
governing social dilemma.
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The remainder of this paper continuous as follows. In
the next section we describe the three studied social dilem-
mas, as well as the employed protocols for the coevolution
of teaching activity and details of performed calculations.
Section 3 features the results, whereas in the last section
we summarize them and briefly discuss their implications.
2 Social dilemmas and coevolutionary rules
Social dilemmas considered within this study are the spa-
tial prisoner’s dilemma, the spatial snowdrift and the spa-
tial stag-hunt game. In all three games players can choose
either to cooperate or defect, whereby mutual coopera-
tion yields the reward R, mutual defection leads to pun-
ishment P , and the mixed choice gives the cooperator the
sucker’s payoff S and the defector the temptation T . De-
pending on the rank of these four payoffs we have the
prisoner’s dilemma game if T > R > P > S, the snow-
drift game if T > R > S > P , and the stag-hunt game
if R > T > P > S. For simplicity, we here take R = 1
and P = 0, which imposes boundaries on the remaining
two payoffs of the form −1 ≤ S ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ T ≤ 2 [15].
The rank of the four payoffs and the latter boundaries
uniquely determine intervals of S and T for each game. To
eschew additional effects of complex network topologies,
and thus focus solely on the impact of introduced coevo-
lutionary rules, we employ a regular L × L square lattice
with periodic boundary conditions irrespective of which
social dilemma applies. Initially, a player on the site x is
designated as a cooperator (sx = C) or defector (D) with
equal probability, and the game is iterated in accordance
with the Monte Carlo simulation procedure comprising
the following elementary steps. First, a randomly selected
player x acquires its payoff px by playing the game with its
four nearest neighbors. Next, one randomly chosen neigh-
bor, denoted by y, also acquires its payoff py by playing
the game with its four neighbors. Last, player x tries to
enforce its strategy sx on player y in accordance with the
probability
W (sy → sx) = wx
1
1 + exp[(py − px)/K]
, (1)
where K denotes the amplitude of noise [48] or its inverse
(1/K) the so-called intensity of selection [49,50], and wx
characterizes the level of teaching activity of player x [37].
One full Monte Carlo generation involves all players hav-
ing a chance to pass their strategies to the neighbors once
on average. At the same time wx is also subjected to an
evolutionary process in accordance with the following pro-
tocol that applies to all three social dilemmas alike. Ini-
tially, all players are given the minimal influence factor
wx = wm ≪ 1, thus assuring a nonpreferential setup of
the game. Note, however, that wm must be positive in or-
der to avoid frozen states, and hence we use wm = 0.01
throughout this study. Next, every time player x succeeds
in enforcing its strategy on y the influence wx may be in-
creased by a constant positive value ∆w ≪ 1 according
to wx → wx + ∆w. Presently we use ∆w = 0.1, which
gives a good compromise between fine increment and no-
ticeable promotion in case of a successful strategy trans-
fer. Finally, the evolution of influence is stopped as soon
as one wx reaches 1. As highlighted above, the described
rule for the evolution of teaching activity is implemented
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depending on the strategy of player x at the time of a
successful reproduction. Namely, we separately study the
case where the coevolutionary rule applies only if sx = C
or only if sx = D. Thus, we consider coevolutionary pro-
motion affecting either only the cooperators (rule A) or
only the defectors (rule B). In both cases the final dis-
tribution of wx is obtained within a short period of time
[typically around 100 to 1000 full Monte Carlo genera-
tions]. In spite of its simplicity the proposed protocol for
the coevolution of teaching activity is remarkably robust,
delivering conclusive results with respect to the promotion
of cooperation.
We have verified the validity of this simple coevolution-
ary rule by employing several alternative, albeit slightly
more sophisticated, coevolutionary protocols. For exam-
ple, we have considered the case by which wx was allowed
to grow also past 1, only that then wx was normalized
according to wx →
wx
wmax
(wmax > 1 being the maximal
out of all wx at any given instance of the game) to assure
that the teaching activity remained bounded to the unit
interval. Another alternative was not to use a fix value of
∆w, but one that varies in time so that the wx = 1 limit is
never reached. In particular, ∆w = (1− wmax)/N , where
N is a constant, can be used to achieve this. The latter co-
evolutionary rule may mimic the possibility that the award
decreases in time, or in other words, that pioneers bene-
fit substantially more from their work than their follow-
ers (see [51] for an interesting recent study of this effect).
However, no matter the details, these alternatives do not
yield significantly different results from the here employed
simplest version, but deviate merely in technical details,
such as the required relaxation times, or relative differ-
ences in the final densities of cooperators on the spatial
grid. It is also worth noting that experimenting with differ-
ent coevolutionary rules may artificially promote cooper-
ative behavior where in fact the environment alone would
be insufficient to sustain cooperation. A model where such
effects could be observed is given when, besides promot-
ing the successful player by increasing its teaching activity,
the unsuccessful player (if it fails to reproduce when at-
tempted) is downgraded via wx → wx − ∆w. In such a
case an extremely high cooperation level can be obtained
by direct promotion of cooperators, which is an artificial
effect. Furthermore, it is possible to consider a natural de-
cay of teaching activity that applies equally to all players,
but such a process is likely to result in a relatively homo-
geneous distribution of w, which is not particularly benefi-
cial for cooperation if compared to the originally proposed
model. We would like to emphasize that our goal was to
present the essence of the considered coevolutionary rules,
and not so much burden with the actual modeling of po-
tential real life scenarios. Thus, we kept the model as sim-
ple as possible, thereby allowing an efficient examination
and strip it from potential artificial influences that other-
wise might have gone unnoticed.
Monte Carlo results presented below were obtained on
populations comprising 400×400 to 1000×1000 individu-
als, whereby the stationary fraction of cooperators ρC was
determined within 5 · 105 to 3 · 106 full Monte Carlo gen-
erations after sufficiently long transients were discarded.
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Moreover, due to the much shorter temporal scale charac-
terizing the evolution of teaching activity and its resulting
heterogeneous distribution, final results were additionally
averaged over 10 to 50 independent runs for each set of
parameter values in order to assure accuracy.
3 Results
We start by presenting time evolutions of ρC separately
for the three considered social dilemmas in Fig. 1, whereby
payoff values are always set such that in the absence of co-
evolution cooperators could not survive. Clearly thus, the
introduction of coevolutionary rules can promote coopera-
tion, albeit the details depend somewhat on the type of the
governing social dilemma as well as the applied rule (type
A or B). In particular, while the coevolutionary promotion
of defectors, introduced above as rule B, always sustains
at least some fraction of cooperators (dashed lines), the
coevolutionary promotion of cooperators (rule A) is inef-
fective in achieving the same goal (solid lines) as it fails
to keep ρC > 0 for the same payoff values irrespective of
which game applies. Nevertheless, it should be noted that
the rather striking difference between rules A and B ap-
pearing by the stag-hunt game is mainly a consequence of
the narrow region of a mixed phase at high noise levels
rather then the difference in ability to promote coopera-
tion, as we will show below. Still, presented results convey
persuasively that coevolutionary promoting defectors is
more beneficial for cooperation than coevolutionary pro-
moting cooperators. Importantly, this is true for the fi-
nal outcome of all games, while at intermediate times it
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Fig. 1. Exemplary time evolutions of ρc for the three consid-
ered social dilemmas: (top) Prisoner’s dilemma game (T = 1.2,
S = 0, K = 2); (middle) Snowdrift game (T = 1.8, S = 0.8,
K = 2); (bottom) Stag-hunt game (T = 0.9, S = −0.33,
K = 2). In all panels solid and dashed lines depict results ob-
tained via the coevolutionary promotion of cooperators (rule
A) and defectors (rule B), respectively.
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Fig. 2. Cooperation level ρC in dependence on the time sep-
aration between strategy and teaching activity updating q for
the prisoner’s dilemma game (T = 1.05, S = 0, K = 0.1).
Open and closed squares show stationary ρc obtained via the
coevolutionary promotion of cooperators (rule A) and defec-
tors (rule B), respectively. Presented results are not relevantly
affected by differences between the considered social dilemmas.
seems that the explicitly promoted strategy will actually
fare better. Note that in all panels solid lines record a no-
ticeable increase of ρC at intermediate times, which is a
direct consequence of the explicit promotion of coopera-
tive behavior via the coevolutionary rule A. Likewise, all
dashed lines depict similarly well-expressed drops of ρC ,
which is again a direct consequence of the applied rule
B explicitly favoring defectors. Yet rather mysteriously,
the tide always shifts in favor of the strategy that is not
affected by the coevolution. It remains of interest to elab-
orate on the cooperation-promoting abilities of the two
coevolutionary rules, and to explain why rule B is more
successful in the long run.
But before examining the outlined facilitative effect of
coevolution on cooperation in Fig. 1 more precisely, we
first test the results against the separation of time scales
[52], presently characterizing the evolution of strategies
and teaching activity. By the model described in Section
2 the two time scales were treated as identical since, de-
pending on the strategy and the applied coevolutionary
rule (A or B), every successful reproduction was followed
by an increase in the player’s teaching activity. This model
can be easily generalized via a parameter q that deter-
mines the probability of increasing the teaching activity
after each successful strategy pass. Evidently, q = 1 re-
covers the originally proposed coevolutionary model while
decreasing q result in increasingly separated time scales.
At q = 0 the model becomes equivalent to the spatial
model without coevolution, hence yielding ρC = 0 by
high-enough T , as demonstrated in Fig. 2. On the other
hand, an increase in q, resulting in a moderately fast yet
effective coevolution, quickly becomes beneficial for coop-
eration since it enables the emergence of relevant hetero-
geneities among the teaching activities of players. It can
also be inferred that the separation of time scales is some-
what more important by the coevolutionary promotion of
defectors (closed squares in Fig. 2), which indicates that
the slower evolution of wx acts against the awarding pro-
cess, and that it is thus optimal to keep the coevolution-
ary process paced similarly fast as the main evolution of
strategies. This conclusion is fully supported by the results
presented in Fig. 2, since ρC increases rather steadily with
increasing values of q. However, since for all q > 0.4 the
stationary values of ρC increase no more than 10 % across
the remaining span of q, we will for simplicity continue to
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use q = 1 in what follows, starting with a more in-depth
examination of above results.
In the following, to elaborate on the outlined cooperation-
promoting effect in Fig. 1, we present in Fig. 3 ρC in
dependence on the full relevant span of a given payoff
for each considered social dilemma. Presented result fully
support, first, that both considered versions of the coevo-
lutionary rule do promote cooperation, and second, that
rule B is more efficient in achieving this goal than rule A.
In general, the impact of coevolution of teaching activity
on cooperation is considerable, but it is also evident that
the smallest impact can be detected when the snowdrift
game applies.
To explain the shift in preference with respect to the
explicitly promoted strategy exemplified at intermediate
times in Fig. 1, we examine the distributions of teaching
activity κA(w) and κB(w) resulting from the application of
coevolutionary rules A and B, respectively. More specifi-
cally, we focus on the difference ∆κ(w) = κB(w)−κA(w),
which is presented in Fig. 4 for the prisoner’s dilemma
game at two different values of K. It can be observed
that the B rule, explicitly promoting defectors, results in
a larger fraction of players that are at least once affected
by the coevolution (w > wm) than the A rule. In fact,
the difference is visible up to w = 0.4, thus indicating
that the segregation of players into active (those having
wx > wm) and virtually (or comparably) inactive (those
having wx = wm) is noticeably stronger if the B rule is
applied. This can be explained by acknowledging the fact
that initially, i.e. in the random environment, the defec-
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Fig. 3. Promotion of cooperation via coevolution of teaching
activity in the three considered social dilemmas: (top) Pris-
oner’s dilemma game (S = 0, K = 0.1); (middle) Snowdrift
game (T = 1.5, K = 0.1); (bottom) Stag-hunt game (T = 0.9,
K = 0.1). In all panels closed circles depict results obtained
with the classical version of the game (in the absence of co-
evolution), while open and closed squares show stationary ρc
obtained via the coevolutionary promotion of cooperators (rule
A) and defectors (rule B), respectively.
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tors are more successful, and thus rule B enables them to
increase their teaching activity very efficiently. Further-
more, the strategy adoption process governed by Eq. 1 is
more frequent when it is closer to the deterministic limit,
and thus this is why the success of active players due to
rule B is better pronounced at small values of the noise
level K. Given the fact that substantial promotion of co-
operation was in the past often associated with strongly
heterogeneous states, for example in form of the host net-
work [14] or social diversity [41], it is reasonable to assume
that the final segregation of players is responsible for the
eventual shift in preference observed by the two coevolu-
tionary rules in Fig. 1, and also for the ultimately more
potent promotion of cooperation via rule B, as demon-
strated in Fig. 3. In particular, we argue that the final
distributions of wx are those having the decisive impact
on the survival of the strategies, whereas during the co-
evolution itself (typically lasting around 100 to 1000 full
Monte Carlo generations) the explicitly favored strategy
simply enjoys a temporary uplift, which however, does not
decisively determine its ultimate fate.
By acknowledging the fact that differences between
κA(w) and κB(w) are better expressed by lower intensi-
ties of selection K (displayed in Fig. 4), we can effectively
support our reasoning by studying the impact of the two
coevolutionary rules by different levels of uncertainty char-
acterizing the strategy adoption process. Figure 5 features
the same results as present in Fig. 3(top), only that now
K = 2 instead of K = 0.1 was used. According to our
above arguments, the larger values of ∆κ(w), observed
 0
 0.01
 0.02
 0.03
 0.04
 0.05
 0.06
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
∆κ
 (w
)
w
Fig. 4. Differences in the distributions of teaching activ-
ity ∆κ(w) brought about by the two coevolutionary rules if
T = 1.2 and S = 0 (prisoner’s dilemma game). Closed and
open squares depict results obtained by K = 0.1 and K = 2,
respectively. Only active players having wx > wm were consid-
ered. Presented results are not relevantly affected by differences
between the considered social dilemmas.
by K = 0.1 in Fig. 4 (compared to K = 2), should con-
sequently result also in a larger difference between the
cooperation-promoting abilities of rules A and B. Indeed,
although the overall promotion of cooperation with re-
spect to the classical version of the prisoner’s dilemma
game is better expressed by K = 2 than K = 0.1, the
relative difference between rules A and B is clearly larger
by K = 0.1. Qualitatively identical results can be ob-
tained also for other types of games, thus confirming that
the decisive impact on the evolutionary success of the two
strategies is issued, not by the explicit coevolutionary pro-
motion of a given strategy, but by the final distribution
of teaching activity resulting from the coevolutionary pro-
cess. Since the coevolutionary promotion of defectors leads
to a stronger segregation of players than the coevolution-
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Fig. 5. Promotion of cooperation via coevolution of teaching
activity in the prisoner’s dilemma game (S = 0,K = 2). Circles
depict results obtained with the classical version of the game
(in the absence of coevolution), while open and closed circles
show stationary ρc obtained via the coevolutionary promotion
of cooperators (rule A) and defectors (rule B), respectively. It
is instructive to compare these results with those presented in
Fig. 3(top).
ary promotion of cooperators (see Fig. 4), the cooperative
behavior ultimately fares better via rule B. Although this
fact might be temporarily masked by the explicit promo-
tive nature of a given strategy due to the workings of the
coevolutionary rule, as exemplified in Fig. 1, eventually
the active players seize full control over the game and re-
veal the true impact of coevolution.
We argue that the increase of cooperation after a tem-
porary setback period indicates that the promotive im-
pact of the coevolutionary process is driven by a posi-
tive feedback mechanism. Notably, a short-term decline of
cooperation has also been observed when the interaction
graph of players was characterized by the scale-free topol-
ogy (see Fig. 5 in Ref.[54]). In the latter case a defector
hub eventually becomes weak due to its predominantly de-
fecting environment, which in turn impairs its ability to
retain the defecting strategy. When the hub becomes oc-
cupied by a cooperator the overall cooperation level rises
rapidly due to the efficient spreading enabled by the high
degree of the prime spot of the network [32,55]. As it was
shown previously, players characterized with higher teach-
ing activities play a similar role as hubs in a heterogeneous
network, in particular, since they also have the ability to
exploit the feedback mechanism postulated by a defect-
ing neighborhood [30]. To validate these arguments for
the present model we measure the density of cooperators
not just for the whole population but also for within the
group of active players, as presented in Fig.6 when rule
B applies. Owing to the fact that thus only defectors can
be supported by the coevolution via increasing wx, the
cooperation density ρC amongst active players starts at
zero. As time passes, however, the active players (initially
all defectors) may accidentally change their strategy and
accordingly ρC can start growing. The growth becomes
more pronounced when active defectors fail to continue to
effectively exploit their neighbors. Then namely they can
no longer defend their active positions and start loosing
frequently to cooperators. And since cooperators are much
more effective in sustaining these prime (active) spots of
the grid than defectors [53], cooperation can from thereon
spread to inactive players as well, and thus uphold the
cooperative behavior even if the temptation to defect is
large. Consequently, the overall cooperation level starts
growing as well. It is worth noting that this mechanism
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Fig. 6. Temporal courses of ρc for the whole population
(dashed line) and for within the group of active players having
wx > wm (solid line). The prisoner’s dilemma game [identical
as in Fig. 1(top)] and the coevolutionary rule B (coevolutionary
promotion of defectors) are applied. Clearly, the active players
determine the final outcome of the game.
directly implies that the density of cooperators amongst
active players is higher than the overall, which is in ac-
cordance with what has already been observed in evolu-
tionary settings where a similar feedback mechanism took
effect [30,53].
4 Summary
We study the impact of simple coevolutionary rules af-
fecting the teaching activity of players indulging either
into the prisoner’s dilemma, the snowdrift or the stag-hunt
game. Irrespective of the details constituting the govern-
ing social dilemma, we demonstrate that the coevolution
of teaching activity yields excessive benefits for the co-
operators, substantially surpassing those that can be ex-
pect from spatiality alone. Rather surprisingly thereby,
we show that the coevolutionary promotion of defectors
is, in the long run, a more potent promoter of cooperation
than the coevolutionary promotion of cooperators. While
in the later case cooperative behavior initially does seem
to fare better, in the long run the stronger segregation of
players brought about by the coevolutionary promotion of
defectors gives it the winning edge. Indeed, we show that
the decisive impact on the evolutionary success of the two
strategies is not issued, as one might intuitively expect,
by the explicit coevolutionary promotion of a given strat-
egy, but by the final distribution of teaching activity re-
sulting from the applied coevolutionary process. Finally,
we explain the cooperation-facilitating effect by showing
that the active players have the ability to uplift the seem-
ingly doomed cooperators and restore a socially viable co-
operative state, whereby exploiting their celebrated role
of higher influence that resulted from the coevolution of
teaching activity at the very infancy of the game.
Presented results reiterate the importance of influen-
tial individuals in social dilemmas and strongly support
the fact that appropriate conditions can emerge sponta-
neously via simple coevolutionary rules, thus fating the so-
ciety to a predominantly cooperative state even if tempta-
tions to defect are high. Nevertheless, care should be exer-
cised when deciding who to promote as seemingly correct
decisions may backfire, and indeed, it seems that some-
times letting the bad seeds to grow is just what eventually
yields the desired garden.
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